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Corporate Adolescence: Why Did 
“We” Not Work?  
 
Donald C. Langevoort & Hillary A. Sale* 
 
 
In academic and public commentary, entrepreneurial finance is usually 
portrayed as a quintessential American success story, an institutional structure 
whereby expert venture capitalists with strong reputational incentives channel 
much-needed equity to deserving entrepreneurs, then subject them to intense 
monitoring to assure they stay on the path to hoped-for success in the form of 
an initial public offering or public company acquisition.1  Thus, it is jarring that 
in recent years there have been so many troubles, from gross embarrassments 
to allegations of outright criminality, at companies like Uber, Theranos, and 
our subject here, WeWork. These dramas are often portrayed in terms of the 
predictable sins of youthfulness: reckless, disruptive, risk-taking behaviors that 
come from the volatile interaction of a charismatic young leader and a cult(ure) 
of STEM-smart followers who buy into the dream.2   
 
* The authors thank Olivia Brown, Samantha Glazer, Hollie Chenault, Claire Creighton, Jing 
Xu, and Michael Marcus for their research, insights, and good humor. 
1  E.g., Bernard Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets, 
47 J. Fin. Econ. 243 (1997) 
2  Among many, see generally ANTONIO GARCIA MARTINEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE 
PROFITS AND RANDOM FAILURES IN SILICON VALLEY (2016); JOHN CARRYREOU, BAD BLOOD: 
SECRETS AND LIES IN SILICON VALLEY (2018)(about the Theranos scandal); MIKE ISSAC, 
PUMPED: THE BATTLE FOR UBER (2019); REEVES WIEDEMAN, BILLION DOLLAR LOSER 
(2020)(WeWork); Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, Geo. L.J. (forthcoming, 2021); 
Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 2017; Erin Griffith, The 
Ugly Ethical Underside of Silicon Valley, Fortune, Dec. 28, 2016.  On the myths and realities 
of youthfulness, see Pierre Azoulay et al., Age and High Growth Entrepreneurship, 2 Am. Econ. 
Rev. Insights 65 (2020); Noam Schreiber, The Shekreli Syndrome: Youthful Trouble, Tech Success, 
Then a Fall, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2017; Spencer Ante & Joann Lublin, Young CEOs: Are They 
Up to the Job?, Wall St. J., Feb. 2012.  We wrote this article in the midst of the Covid19 
pandemic, which has disrupted all aspects of the economy and society.  We express no 
opinion on what the world of start-ups (or anything else) will be like when the virus finally 
fades, and recognize that it could force a greater level of maturity in the short run. See Rolfe 
Winkler, Tech Founders Now Need to Grow Up Fast, Wall St. J., April 18-19, 2020, at B1. 
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 We have no quarrel here with the historical record of success. But the 
market for start-up capital constantly changes.3  We are not the first legal 
academics to express concern about whether the conventional model is 
descriptively or normatively suited to today’s world, particularly as the period 
of time from the first capital raise to exit becomes much longer and sources of 
private capital grow much larger.4  This allows some privileged firms (especially 
the so-called “unicorns”5) to deepen their footprint on society and the economy 
substantially before taking on the disclosure-oriented obligations of public 
corporation status.  Or maybe never take them on at all.  Indeed, while the 
public and private worlds stay distinct as a matter of law,6 the forces of 
publicness are intruding on the private domain7 and raising the risks to 
recklessness and avoidance.   
Our title’s metaphorical reference to corporate adolescence is meant to 
underscore the ever-lengthening period of time, and the resulting temptations 
without sufficient grown-up supervision, that high-tech start-up companies 
have before undergoing the so-called rites of passage to public adulthood.8  We 
argue that this runs the risk of (by failing to lean against) a build-up of bad 
 
3  See Josh Lerner & Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation: What We 
Know and How Much We Still Need to Learn, 34 J. Econ. Persp. 237, 253 
(2020)(“Understanding why traditional venture capital contractual provisions have faded in 
importance and their social welfare implications appears to be a promising area of future 
research for both theorists and empiricists alike,” pointing to some of the high-profile 
scandals noted earlier). 
4  See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 155 (2019); Jennifer S. Fan, 
Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 583 (2016); Usha 
Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevance of Section 12(g), 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1561; 
Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act, How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that 
Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 Ind. L. Rev. 151 (2013); Donald C. Langevoort 
& Robert B. Thompson, Publicness in Contemporary Securities Regulation after the JOBS Act, 101 
Geo. L.J. 337 (2012). 
5 See Keith Brown & Kenneth Wiles, The Growing Blessing of Unicorns, 32 J. App. Corp. Fin. 
52 (2020). 
6  See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries 
in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1573 (2013). 
7  See Donald C. Langevoort, The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, and "Privateness" on 
Corporate Cultures, 43 Seattle U. L. Rev. 377 (2020).  On publicness generally, see Hillary 
A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 1629 (2014). 
8  See also Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 165, 166 
(2017). There is a strand of literature on the “mature” start-up, however, this appears simply 
to refer to firms well along the pre-public growth curve, not the behavioral context.  E.g., 
Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold: Equity Compensation and the Mature Start-up, 11 Va. L. & Bus. 
Rev. 613 (2017). 
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choices and testy behaviors commonly observed in human adolescents, e.g., 
risk-taking and rule-breaking, thereby embedding in the firm’s habits and 
culture problems that may later be hard to fix. This is especially true when the 
founders themselves are young and prone to immature behavior, though we do 
not so limit our attention. There is rhetorical expression of the problem in 
familiar memes like “fake it ‘til you make it” and “move fast and break things.”   
 To explore all this, we borrow an approach from business school case 
studies.9  We tell the WeWork story in some detail, not simply because it is 
interesting (which it is) but because it starkly poses a question that many—
investors, board members, lawyers, and regulators, among others—will find 
difficult to answer. How could this happen as against all the high-powered 
incentives and smart-money discipline that supposedly exists in venture 
finance?10   And what if anything could or should have been done differently, 
particularly by way of corporate governance?  By itself, WeWork is just an 
anecdote, and to an extent an aberration. But toggling back and forth between 
narrative and analysis, our article makes the case that start-up adolescence is 
both an apt metaphor and real cause for concern.   
 We do not try to resolve all this normatively, content mainly with 
showing the interplay of conflicts in start-up financing that lead to the 
prediction that the situation is a persistently risky one, where the risks and costs 
fall on less sophisticated investors, retail and institutional, and with unfortunate 
spillovers to the capital markets generally.  Insistence on private ordering has a 
dark side.  So we point with some frustration to the recent pushes by Congress 
and the SEC to increase the number of retail investors eligible to invest in this 
space, in the name of “opportunity” that is more likely to turn into 
opportunism.  
 
I.  THE WEWORK STORY, PART 1 
 
 
9   For a case study involving legal ethics in the context of the Theranos scandal, see Gautam 
Hans, How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study (May 29, 
2020). Georgia State University Law Review, Forthcoming 2021, available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3613443. 
10 See Pollman, supra note 4 (“If VCs are strong monitors, why are examples of oversight 
failures so plentiful and varied?”). 
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 A dreamer who envisions co-working office space on Mars, and a man 
raised by a women’s collective in Oregon.11  They were the builders of 
WeWork – literally.  Adam Neumann was a schemer, who persuaded long-
time real estate moguls and Silicon Valley funders, who “didn’t do real estate,” 
to support the company.  Miguel McKelvey was part architect, part schemer, 
and a hands-on builder.  In 2019, McKelvey was the Chief Culture Officer and 
Neumann was the Chief Executive Officer of a Series H Unicorn with a 
valuation of $47 Billion.12  In 2020, Neumann was out as CEO, and the private 
valuation was down to $7.3 billion. 13 By March of 2020, the valuation was at 
$2.9 billion and by June, McKelvey had stepped down as well.14 
WeWork began when Adam Neumann rented out part of the office 
space he was using in a Brooklyn office where he was selling high-end baby 
clothes.  In an effort to cut costs, he rented out a corner of his office to someone 
he found on craigslist.  Shortly thereafter, Neumann looked at another building 
with his landlord, Joshua Guttman.  Neumann proposed a co-working idea, 
with a shared profit.  Guttman bit, and Neumann then approached McKelvey 
about the idea.  Green Desk was the outcome – and the predecessor to 
WeWork, though it was decidedly different from what WeWork would 
become.15 
Despite fears about the economy, the company opened in 2008, and the 
idea took off.16  Later, Neumann and McKelvey sold their share of the business 
to Guttman for $3 million dollars to be paid over several years.  In 2011, they 
used  cash from the sale, credit cards, and loans from friends, to relocate the 
concept to SoHo, and opened the first office of what was to become the 
WeWork model.  Neumann then sent “free” plane tickets to friends in Israel 
 
11 Alex Konrad, Inside The Phenomenal Rise Of WeWork, Forbes (Nov. 5, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2014/11/05/the-rise-of-
wework/#6a557b606f8b. 
12Sophia Kunthara, From Hot to Not: A Timeine of WeWork’s IPO Implosion, Crunchbase (Oct. 1, 
2019 https://news.crunchbase.com/news/from-hot-to-not-a-timeline-of-weworks-ipo-
implosion/.  Indeed, just one year earlier, the company had the third largest startup 
valuation, after Uber and Airbnb. 
13   Lauren Feiner, SoftBank values WeWork at $2.9 billion, down from $47 billion a year ago, 
CNBC (May 18, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/18/softbank-ceo-calls-
wework-investment-foolish-valuation-falls-to-2point9-billion.html. 
14  Deirdre Bosa, WeWork co-founder Miguel McKelvey is leaving at the end of the month, CNBC (June 5, 
2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/wework-co-founder-miguel-mckelvey-is-leaving-
at-the-end-of-the-month.html. 
15 Konrad, supra note 11.  
16 Konrad, supra note 11. 
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who thought they were coming to the States for fun, and who ended up working 
seven days a week, doing the construction build out.17 
By 2012, WeWork had multiple locations and big aspirations.  
Neumann spoke publicly about expanding technology, but when asked how or 
why, he did not have an answer.  This is notable, because such statements, in a 
publicly traded company, can be the root of class action claims for liability.18  
Nevertheless, the company continued to grow and to raise private money.  In 
January 2012, WeWork raised $6.85 million from friends and family; $17 
million in a Series A in July, 2012; $40 million in a Series B in May, 2013; and 
$150 million in a Series C in February, 2014.19  These numbers were about 
double the size of the average Series rounds in the same timeframe.20 
The Series C round was particularly notable because the company 
attracted the attention of Benchmark, one of Silicon Valley’s most well-known 
venture capital funds.21  Because Benchmark had not done real estate before, its 
leader flew to New York to vet the concept and see firsthand why WeWork 
was different from other shared office space concepts.  Sold on Neumann’s 
vision, Benchmark valued the company at $100 million and then, when the 
investment bank Jefferies joined, the valuation increased to $450 million.  
Shortly thereafter, McKelvey pitched Jared Kushner and won a prize spot as an 
anchor tenant in a Dumbo project.22 
In the same timeframe, the adolescent side of WeWork was increasingly 
becoming public – and receiving press coverage.  For example, in 2012, the 
 
17 Konrad, supra note 11.  
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  
19 Dylan Tweney, WeWork raises $355M at nearly $5B valuation, plans IPO, VentureBeat (Dec. 
15, 2014), https://venturebeat.com/2014/12/15/wework-raises-355m-at-nearly-5b-
valuation-plans-ipo/.   
20 Average seed capital in 2012 was $1.7 million; average series A in 2012 was 9.2 million; 
average series B in 2013 was 17.2 million.  https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/25/a-quick-
look-at-how-fast-series-a-and-seed-rounds-have-ballooned-in-recent-years-fueled-by-top-
investors/. The average series C in 2014 was $26 million.  https://tech.co/news/much-
funding-raise-round-2015-05). 
21 Konrad, supra note 11.  
22 Konrad, supra note 11. Neumann, a former Israeli soldier, reportedly assisted longtime 
friend Kushner in the development of a video promoting peace in the Middle East. According 
to Vanity Fair, Neumann asked WeWork development director Roni Bahar to find an 
advertising firm to create "a slick video for Kushner that would showcase what an 
economically transformed West Bank and Gaza would look like." Gabriel Sherman, You 




company started taking entrepreneurs and employees to camp, and in 2014, 
the New York Times went along.23  The family of Adam Neumann’s wife, Rebekah 
Paltrow Neumann, owns a summer camp in the Adirondacks, and the company 
used it for several years.  The culture at camp, which echoed that of the 
company was, well, adolescent.  The goal was networking and “a change of 
pace.”24  There was neither reliable cellphone service nor Wi-Fi. Instead, 
hookahs, vintage typewriters, and canoes loaded with beer were aplenty.”25  
Marijuana was not provided but was in “abundance.”   
In 2014, at the time when Benchmark was considering investing 
additional funds, one 31-year old entrepreneur at camp was wearing tattoos on 
his face and body and holding Super Soaker Water Guns filled with vodka.  He 
stated that he was “getting into as much trouble as humanly possible.”  Another 
man also carrying a Super Soaker, “declared to the crowd, ‘If you don’t want 
to see me naked, don’t go to camp.’  Another had turned his free camp T-shirt 
into a crop top and said, ‘We’re gonna bro out so hard.’”  Then, he noted that 
the camp had a “different vibe than… the city or even the Hamptons, … 
[where] you still have a certain level of internal restraint.”26  
 
Restraint and WeWork, however, did not go hand-in-hand.  Neumann 
roamed the office in bare feet.  The company offered unlimited free beers to 
employees and tenants at all hours of the day.  Neumann also loved Don Julio 
tequila and would persuade employees to take shots of it at 2 a.m. meetings.27  
Marijuana at work was common, as was dancing around fires in the woods on 
the weekends.28  Neumann even “installed an infrared sauna and a cold plunge 
pool in his Manhattan office.” 29  
Despite the adolescent antics, the funding continued. Indeed, a few 
months after the 2014 New York Times camp article appeared, in December 
 
23 Marisa Meltzer, WeWork Goes to Summer Camp, The New York Times, (Sept. 5, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/fashion/wework-goes-to-summer-camp.html. 
24 Meltzer, supra note 23.  
25 Meltzer, supra note 23. 
26 Meltzer, supra note 23.   
27 Amy Chozick, Adam Neumann and the Art of Failing Up, The New York Times (May 18, 
2020),  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/business/adam-neumann-wework-exit-
package.html. 
28 Chozick, supra note 27.  
29 Chozick, supra note 27. 
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2014, WeWork raised $355 million in a Series D offering.30  It was still not 
profitable but was valued at $5 billion.  The investors included big names:  
Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, and the press reported that an initial public 
offering (IPO) was likely in the next few years.31 
Although Neumann compared the company to Uber and Airbnb, both 
of which were in the “sharing” economy, WeWork’s model was riskier, because 
WeWork actually owned or leased the office space that people shared.32  The 
liability, so to speak, belonged to WeWork. Even before the COVID-19 
pandemic, the success of the business model depended on WeWork’s 
continued ability to service long-term leases on real estate by renting out office 
space at a higher price on a short-term lease. The model also relied upon 
continued demand for cramped office space where people work elbow-to-
elbow.  At the time of the Series D, of course, money for entrepreneurs was 
flowing and making it possible for them to afford the rent, but the key question 
was what would happen to the business model when the bubble burst and 
WeWork still had all that property.33 
 
As we will see, the bubble did burst – when publicness intervened.  But 
not before WeWork did a Series E ($444 M), F ($690 M), G ($4.4 B), and H 
($1 B).34  All of these fundraising rounds were delineated as “late stage,” and all 
are significant in size.  None raised eyebrows.  Instead, initially skeptical 
investors (JP Morgan) lined up for opportunities, and  Masayoshi Son of 




30 Lindsay Gellman and Eliot Brown, WeWork: Now a $5 Billion Co-Working Startup, WALL ST. 
J. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-now-a-5-billion-real-estate-
sartup-1418690163.  
31 Tweney, supra note 19. 
32 Issie Lapowsky, Believe It: Co-Working Space Startup WeWork Is Now Worth $5B, Wired (Dec. 
16, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/wework-valuation/. 
33 Lapowsky, supra note 31.  
34 Sophia Kunthara, WeWork May Reduce Its Valuation Ahead of IPO By Tens of Billons, Crunchbase 
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/wework-may-reduce-its-valuation-
ahead-of-ipo-by-tens-of-billions/.  
35 Katrina Brooker, WeFail: How the Doomed Masa Son-Adam Neumann relationship set WeWork 





  The story of Mr. Son’s investment is apparently “famous.”36  Neumann 
spent only 12 minutes with Son touring the WeWork headquarters before 
reaching agreement on a  $4.4 billion investment – an investment for which 
Mr. Son’s son has expressed regret.37  Then, Neumann hopped into his white 
Mercedes Maybach and, while his chauffeur drove, listened to rap and enjoyed 
the win.38  Many say that this investment and the opinion of Son, that Neumann 
should take on even more wild ideas, is part of what led to the WeWork 
downfall.39  But, as Part III will reveal, the board, the bankers, and others all 
played a role. 
 After the Softbank investment, Neumann’s grandiosity accelerated.  He 
wanted to be the world’s first trillionaire.  He wanted to be president of the 
world.40  He started WeLive, a concept for short term apartment rentals – but 
framed them as places that would “drive down suicide rates because ‘no one 
ever feels alone.’”41  He described the WeGrow school and a plan to “shelter 
the world’s orphans” and “give them a family, the WeWork family.”42  “There 
was talk of a WeBank, WeSail, WeSleep, an airline.”43  And still the money 
came in and talk of an IPO grew. 
 The IPO, however, was the financial undoing of WeWork.  The antics 
and choices, the burn rate, the conflicts of interest, and the lack of hope for 
profitability all became public – though not until after the bankers had floated 
a huge valuation with an “incoherent prospectus” and were forced to pull it 
back.44  The business model, long-term leases on real estate that was renovated 
and rented with short term leases, i.e., no long run predictability of revenues, 
was always flawed.  Initial valuations for the IPO were in the $40-50 billion 
range and even when dropped to $10 billion, the company discovered it had no 
buyers.45  This was the point at which publicness met WeWork and its 
governance choices head on.   
 
36 Chozick, supra note 27. 
37 Feiner, supra note 13.  
38 Chozick, supra note 27. 
39 Brooker, supra note 35.  
40 Chozick, supra note 27. 
41 Chozick, supra note 27. 
42 Chozick, supra note 27. 
43 Chozick, supra note 27. 
44 Chozick, supra note 27. 
45 Joshua Franklin and Anirban Sen, WeWork delays IPO after frosty investor response, Reuters 




Although the wheels came off the WeWork bus at the time of the IPO, 
the seeds of its crash were planted much earlier.  The culture inevitably 
produced allegations like those at Uber, of discrimination and a “frat-boy 
culture.”46  Neumann’s Chief of Staff claimed she was demoted and fired for 
being pregnant and raising concerns about Neumann turning the company jet 
into a “hotbox,” filled with marijuana smoke.47  Another lawsuit included claims 
of sexual assault at a work event and groping at the summer camp.48  According 
to the complaint, both incidents were reported to HR and neither resulted in 
discipline to the men involved.49  The company later stated, without admitting 
anything, that such behavior would not be tolerated, but the problem was that 
the “culture” of WeWork was the product of the corporate adolescence and 
cult of personality our “regulatory” regime has promoted. 
WeWork grew because it was the beneficiary of the “private” offering 
regime and a tech/Unicorn bubble in which the market encouraged companies 
with huge burn rates and behavior that, in the public space, would not have 
been acceptable.  When the venture capital investors, who had put more than 
$12 billion into WeWork, wanted to cash out and Masa Son’s cash infusions 
stopped, “Neumann was blindsided.” It appears that although he may not have 
understood the potential for the party to stop, he did understand the value of 
the privilege with which he was operating.  But, without cash to support the 
burn, Neumann who “never wanted to go public … and wanted to remain 
private so he could do whatever the f--- he wanted,” yielded to the pressure to 
go public – or at least try to do so.50   
Unfortunately for Neumann, the market’s interest in and tolerance for 
companies based on ideas that might generate cash but not profits had waned.  
Uber’s offering was a huge disappointment to investors.51  Another company 
with a culture of corporate adolescence, Uber had faced a series of scandals 
 
46 Gaby Del Valle, WeWork's “frat-boy” culture enables sexual harassment, new suit claims, Vox 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/12/17969190/wework-
lawsuit-sexual-assault-harassment-retaliation. 
47 David Yaffe-Bellany, WeWork’s Ousted C.E.O. Adam Neumann is Accused of Pregnancy 
Discrimination, The New York Times (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/business/wework-neumann-discrimination-
complaint.html. 
48 Del Valle, supra note 46.  
49 Complaint, Bardhi v. WeWork, EEOC (Oct. 31, 2019), http://www.wigdorlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/Bardhi-v.-WeWork-Filed.pdf  
50 Sherman, supra note 22. 




that, because its founder, Travis Kalanick retained control, had been 
consistently ignored – that is, until the company’s board finally bowed to 
publicness and pressure. A venture capital director who had made sexist 
comments resigned, Kalanick was pushed out (and paid off), and a new CEO, 
with a strong positive and public company reputation, Dara Khosrowshahi, was 
installed.52   
Khosrowshahi’s job was to clean up Uber’s and manage the company 
through an IPO.53  He did so, but with mixed results.  He began with apologies 
and statements about the commitment to a changed culture, one that would not 
tolerate sexual harassment and law breaking in the core of the business.54  He 
used words like “trust” and stressed the choices the company was now making 
to, arguably, grow up and understand its publicness and social license.  
Although the scandals played a significant role in the pressure a cultural shift, 
both Uber and WeWork craved cash.  Cash is king in a company with a high 
burn rate, and as the private money dries up, IPO pressure increases. 
Eventually, Khosrowshahi did take Uber public, but the private “value” of the 
company never materialized.  The offering price, $45.00 per share, was well 
below the company’s private valuations, and before the pandemic hit, Uber’s 
stock was trading only at $41.00 per share.55   
Whether the same will be true for WeWork remains to be seen.56  Its 
attempted IPO failed in a very public fashion, resulting in considerable media 
coverage about the adolescent antics of its founders, its conflicted structure, 
and the lack of corporate governance controls, to which we return in Part III.     
 
II. THE POTENTIAL PATHOLOGIES OF START-UP CAPITAL RAISING 
 
52 Evan Mills, A Short history of the Many, Many Ways Uber Screwed Up, Wired (June 21, 
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/timeline-uber-crises/. Mike Isaac, With Uber’s 
I.P.O., Dara Khosrowshahi is Taking Travis Kalanick’s Company Public, The New York Times 
(May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/technology/uber-ipo-ceo-dara-
khosrowshahi-travis-kalanick.html. 
53 Isaac, supra note 52.  
54 Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 47.  
55 Mike Isaac, Michael J. de la Merced, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, How the Promise of a $120 
Billion Uber I.P.O Evaporated, The New York Times (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/technology/uber-ipo-price.html.  
56  WeWork remains an operating company with considerable presence in the shared office 
space marketplace, but without the mythology that drove its ambitions.  What we describe 




The WeWork story shows what can happen within the domain of 
corporate adolescence, but not whether it is commonplace enough to worry 
deeply about.  Surely most start-ups are not so immature.  And even if it the 
risk of such behavior is worrisome, the conventional venture finance narrative 
predicts that it should be self-correcting: bad experiences like these will teach 
funders a lesson that they would be foolish not to learn from, and their 
reputational interests will incentivize them to take interest.  We pause here to 
address these two arguments. 
When VCs finance a high-potential start-up, they only fund enough to 
get the company moving toward success,57 at which point the start-up must 
obtain a second round of financing, mostly from new sources of money, and 
then a third, and so-on.  (Seven or eight rounds would not be unusual today.)  
There is a high-powered incentive to make it up each step of the ladder, with 
regular scrutiny of the value of the firm at this still early stage.  The founders 
feel this sharply; so do the funders who have sunk so much money at an earlier 
round.  With growing evidence of success, the founders and early funders can 
hold onto more of the enterprise; with troubles, that may be hard.  Those 
investors who have tied their fortunes to the founder do not want to mess with 
what appears (in myth or reality) to be the firm’s best shot.  
 
A.  Behavioral Agency Costs 
 
1. Edgy Behavior 
 
 Our quick overview of high-tech start up financing gives ample reason 
to explain why founders will often find themselves shading the truth to stand 
out.  The initial pitch requires aggressive claims of an ability to achieve 
promised results; after that, their feet are to the fire through the search for new 
rounds of investment.  The risk of failure is palpable—most start-ups do not 
survive the gauntlet.  
 
57  On how they do this, see Paul Gompers et al., How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions?, 
135  J. Fin. Econ. 169 (2020).   
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 The temptation to dissemble in such high-stakes, high-expectations 
environments would be natural for most people and most organizations.58  
“Motivated inference” is the general phenomenon by which people exploit the 
moral wiggle-room of ambiguity about both reality and expectations—reality 
in terms of the enterprise being pitched, expectations about what to say or do 
(or not say or do).  Early stage ventures reek of uncertainty, which can support 
inflated optimism that may be in good faith, but not necessarily warranted.59 
Gradually, and down a very slippery slope of self-deception along with the 
deception of others, representations about the venture’s progress take on a life 
of their own.60  If there are conscious doubts about the project in its early stages, 
ambiguity about disclosure norms can provide comfort.  Many people feel 
justified in leaving out troubling details from a statement otherwise technically 
true, even though half-truths are fraudulent as a matter of law.61  This is where 
the perception (if not reality) of prevailing norms can be summoned to duty for 
good cause, project success.  Some version of  “everyone does it” enables those 
with brilliant hopes and dreams to fake it with the expectation that all will be 
forgiven or forgotten when they make it.   
 Certain situational pressures abundant in start-ups increase the 
likelihood of dishonesty.62  Loss aversion is the tendency to take greater risks to 
avoid losing what they possess relative to what they would take when seeking 
to gain precisely the same thing; once started and financed, threats are filtered 
through a loss frame. Cognitive stress and physical tiredness make 
misrepresentation more likely. What starts out as innocent becomes a trap as 
the adverse consequences of telling the truth grow. 
 
58 See Yuri Mishina et al, Why Good Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High 
Expectations and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality, 53 Acad. Mgt. J. 701 (2010).   
59  This can take the form of conscious rationalization by entrepreneurs (see Elizabeth 
Pollman, Private Company Lies) or a more pernicious form of self-deception whereby the 
entrepreneur is firmly convinced of the rightness, and righteousness, of what he or she says 
or thinks.  See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, 
WALL STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 26-28, 38-42 (2016). 
60  For an in-depth explanation,, see Vasilis Theoharakis et al., Going Down the Slippery Slope 
of Legitimacy Lies in Early Stage Ventures: The Role of Moral Disengagement, J. Bus. Ethics (2020).   
61  See Todd Rogers et al., Artful Paltering: The Risks and Rewards of Using Truthful Statements  to 
Mislead Others, 112 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 456 (2017); see also Christina Bicchieri et al., It’s 
Not a Lie If Your Believe the Norm Does Not Apply: Conditional Norm Following with Strategic Beliefs, 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ppc/wpaper/0012.html  (2019).   
62 See Theoharakis et al., supra; for further discussion of ethics in the start-up arena, see 
Jared Harris, Ethics and Entrepreneurship, 24 J. Bus. Vent. 407 (2009); Robert Cressey et al., 
Entrepreneurship, Governance and Ethics, 95 J. Bus. Ethics 117 (2010). 
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 That much applies to just about anybody in those circumstances.63  But 
those who choose to become entrepreneurs have dispositions that can make 
them more susceptible than most.  A body of specialized research exists about 
entrepreneurial psychology, suggesting that start-up founders have greater-
than-normal tendencies toward self-efficacy, self-assurance, autonomy, power 
and independence.64  They are often highly intense and creative “think outside 
the box” people.  And even though each of these traits is an attractive one in 
terms of who we think of as likely to succeed, each is also associated with a 
higher risk of the kind of ethical risk-taking referred to earlier.  Danny Miller, 
a noted organizational psychologist who focuses on entrepreneurs, refers to this 
as the “Janus face” problem.65  The adulation of the good face obscures the 
heightened risk of the bad.  In other words, the hyper-creative looks outside 
the lines for opportunities and so discovers value; he (or less likely, but not 
impossibly, she) also ignores lines that are not supposed to be crossed.66  
Somewhat provocatively, one econometric study of entrepreneurs suggests a 
combination of high cognitive ability and a history of illicit adolescent behavior 
correlates with later success in this rough and tumble world.67   
 2.  Youth 
 If entrepreneurs are generally more disposed toward risky behaviors, 
then the young entrepreneurs who have such a claim on the public’s fascination 
presumably inhabit an even higher behavioral risk category.  To be clear, we 
are not claiming that young founders dominate the start-up world.  One study 
shows that the average age of a successful founder is in the early to mid-40s, 
often after one or more unsuccessful tries.68  But the authors of that study 
acknowledge that young founders are a significant presence in the start-up 
 
63  See Scott Rick & George Loewenstein, Hypermotvation, 45 J. Consumer Res. 645 (2008). 
64 Many of these can be bundled into what is the most widely recognized bias of successful 
business people, overconfidence. See David Hirshleifer, Are Overconfident CEOs Better 
Innovators, 67 J. Fin. 1457 (2012); LANGEVOORT, supra, at 27. 
65 Danny Miller, A Downside to the Entreprenurial  Personality?, 39 Entrepreneurship: Theory 
and Practice 1, 2 (Jan. 2015) 
66  See Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of Creativity, 102 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 
445 (2011). 
67  See Ross Levine & Yona Rubenstein, Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes an Entrepreneur and Do 
They Earn More?, 132 Q.J. Econ. 963 (2017)( “[e]ven as teenagers, those who incorporate 
later in life tend to score higher on learning aptitude tests, exhibit greater self-esteem, and 
engage in more illicit activities than other people”). 
68  Azoulay et al., supra 
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world and may be even preferred by many venture capitalists.  They generate 
a powerful mythology. 
 Entrepreneurs in their 20s and early 30s are, presumably, more likely 
than their elders to exhibit the kinds of adolescent and post-adolescent 
behaviors common generally—more impulsive, norms-challenging, and 
aggressive, only gradually becoming more mature.  Those given millions of 
dollars in early-round funding have their self-esteem validated before ever 
having struggled to success, and are prone to compensate for the reality that 
they may be in over their head with grandiose expressions of self-efficacy.  
Putting aside for a moment their VC handlers on the board of directors, they 
are likely to be surrounded by similarly young cohorts, with a resulting echo 
chamber in terms of exuberance and confidence.  If given a long (or no) leash, 
they may be especially creative, intense and motivated, but undisciplined.  Not 
having much in the way of experience to draw from in knowing which lines are 
meant to be challenged or not, they may convince each other that all lines are 
suspect or to be ignored.   
 Because of the closed-in, secretive nature of early stage ventures, this is 
a hard proposition to test empirically.  With respect to public companies, CEO 
age is associated with a higher risk appetite among males69 and greater 
competitiveness.70  CEO behavior (on the job and private), in turn, has a viral 
effect on the rest of the team of employees, signaling that ethical aggression is 
indeed the way to get ahead.71  In other words, the youthful organization as a 
whole is arguably more susceptible to inflated entitlement precisely because of 
its collective naiveté.   
 3.  Gender 
 By all accounts, the world of high-tech start-up capital-raising has a 
diversity problem, including massive gender inequality.  Stories of hostile work 
environments abound. Despite evidence that female start ups are more 
 
69 Matthew Serfling, CEO Age and the Riskiness of Corporate Policies, 25 J. Corp. Fin. 251 (2014); 
Jarrko Peltomaki et al., Age, Gender and Risk-taking: Evidence from S&P 500 Executives, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2547516. 
70   See Yim, The Acquisitiveness of Youth, CEO Age, and Acquisition Behavior, 108 J. Fin. Econ. 
250 (2013); Maurice Levi et al., Deal or No Deal: Hormones and the M&A Game, 56 Mgt. Sci. 
1452 (2010)(using CEO age as proxy for male hormone-driven behavior). 
71  See Lee Biggerstaff et al., Suspect CEOs, Unethical Culture, and Corporate Misbehavior, 117 J. 
Fin. Econ. 98 (2015). On off-the-job behavior, see Why Boards Should Worry About Executives 
Off-the-Job Behavior, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2020, at 17; Tom Lin, Executive Private 
Misconduct, 88 G.W. L. Rev. 327 (2020).   
15 
 
successful than those of their male counterparts,72 in 2017, for example, 
venture capitalists put thirty-five times the money into male-founded start-ups 
than female founded; the number of male founded start-ups financed was 
sixteen times the number of female founded firms.73  The venture capital 
industry itself is heavily male dominated.  The reasons are many, no doubt, for 
this situation. While there is some evidence showing willingness to hear diverse 
pitches,74 VCs may well be using stereotypical heuristics for deciding what 
constitutes promise—mental images of the aggressiveness and single-minded 
intensity it takes to succeed that generate a natural gender bias in funding 
choices.75  The gross gender imbalance in an industry where connections and 
networks matter is bound to be self-perpetuating, and change slowly.  And the 
supply of talented women is truncated by stereotypes and bias all along the 
career progression, so that the pool of women entrepreneurs is smaller than it 
should be.   
 Whatever the precise cluster of reasons for the bias, male domination is 
likely to amplify the risky and aggressive traits and behaviors predicted above.  
By some combination of hormones and role socialization, men are more likely 
to cheat than women, a tendency that grows larger in group settings.  From 
this, one might presume that early stage start-ups too often offer, among many 
other things, an intense male bonding experience that trumps truth-telling. 
B.  Downstream Agency Costs 
 
In the conventional account of start-up finance, VC and other funders 
bargain for sufficient control rights to enable close monitoring for risky 
behaviors by founders and their teams.  There is ample evidence of founders 
 
72 See Katie Abouzahr, Matt Krentz, John Harthorne, and Frances Brooks Taplett, "Why 
Women-Owned Startups Are a Better Bet," Boston Consulting Group (June 6, 
2018), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/why-women-owned-startups-are-
better-bet (finding that startups founded and co-founded by women generated 78 cents for 
every dollar while those founded by men produced only 31 cents per dollar).  
73  See Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Gender, Race and Entrepreneurship, April 2020, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301982.  One argument in favor 
of a liberalized crowdfunding exemption was that the “crowd” would be more open to 
diversity in founders of start-ups.  There is some evidence to support that hope as to women 
founders.  See Schwartz, supra.   
74  Gornall & Strebulaev, supra. 
75  See Kamal Hassan et al., How the VC Pitch Process is Failing Female Entrepreneurs, Harv. Bus. 
Rev., Jan. 13, 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/01/how-the-vc-pitch-process-is-failing-
female-entrepreneurs.   
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being deposed as CEOs by funder-dominated boards.76  So in theory, the 
tendencies described above should be kept in check. 
But that depends on funder bargaining power at each stage of financing, 
and by many accounts, the last decade (at least) has been marked by a shift in 
power to the founder. There are more non-traditional sources of capital to 
compete with the well-known VC firms, placing considerable limitations on 
what they can demand from founders with good ideas.77 Neither VCs nor 
private equity funders want a reputation for being overbearing, which might 
hurt when competing for the next hot deal.78  New money sloshes around over 
the course of all the financing rounds, a reason start-ups can stay private longer 
to capture as much of the upside potential as possible for founders and early 
funders before exit. 
This leads to mixed incentives, especially (as with SoftBank and 
WeWork) later investors are willing not only to buy new rounds of equity from 
the issuer but also let earlier funders cash out in the same transaction.  
Monitoring via internal controls can be costly, which is of concern because 
start-ups tend to be cash poor and motivated to spend precious capital on that 
which demonstrates tangible progress.  Better governance devices might seem 
a luxury early on, especially to entrepreneurs new to the business world, and 
quickly become a form of deferred maintenance.  
 There are also mixed incentives that come from the frequent re-
valuations that come with each new round of financing.  Start-ups are naturally 
hard to value because they are so speculative, which is problematic in and of 
 
76 That said, one reason given for VC preference for youthful founders is that they might not 
drive as hard a bargain out of inexperience.  See Azoulay et al., supra. 
77  Many investors that once participated in venture capital via investments in venture capital 
funds now invest directly, which they treat as a major disruption of conventional venture 
finance.  Lerner & Nanda, supra note 3, at 244, 252.  One major change has been the growth 
in size and influence of corporate venture capital (i.e., captive funds deployed via 
investments in start-ups that could benefit the corporate owner of the fund in various ways).  
See Jennifer Fan, Catching Disruption: Regulating Corporate Venture Capital, 2018 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 341, 376 (noting the proliferation of new sources in the form of “tourist investors”). 
78  Lerner & Nanda, supra note 3, at 252 (“This pattern [of founder friendly behavior] has 
been especially true in the last few years, given the proliferation of non-traditional investors 
such as SoftBank, sovereign wealth funds, and corporations.  In an intensely competitive 
market, some venture capital firms may be tempted to pitch entrepreneur-friendly contracts 
to founders in an attempt to get access to the most attractive deals. . .  Reflecting this 
competition, venture capital groups may have chosen to outdo each other in the extent of 
their hospitality to company founders”). 
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itself since relative power and control rights shift at each funding round.  That 
creates an incentive to the creation of good news and the suppression of bad, 
which need not necessarily suggest fraud but, as discussed earlier, biased 
perceptions.  Whether VCs or other early stage funders have an incentive to 
expose risks and shortfalls via heavy monitoring is questionable, suggesting 
some slack.  Knowing too much can be dangerous. Sophisticated later stage 
funders will understand this, but may nonetheless be limited by competitive 
pressures from the increasingly diverse funding sources, especially at the later 
stages.  With larger and larger sums of money in the hands of competing later 
round funders like private equity firms, hedge funds and even mutual funds, 
bidding wars can ensue to reveal who has the most optimistic (not realistic) 
valuation—the so-called winner’s curse.  There is no good way of betting 
against the company on the short-side, as there is in more well-developed 
financial markets.79  Bubbles cam result that no one has a strong incentive to 
pop by looking too closely for misbehavior in the face of apparent progress. 
We leave to others further exploration of the directly conflicting 
interests among founders and multi-round funders that this valuation 
uncertainty produces, and the wide array of contractual responses.80  The less 
well-appreciated conflicts story, among legal academics at least, faces in a 
different direction: the conflicts (and incentive to inflate values) arising from 
the relationship between funders and their own upstream suppliers of capital.  
Nearly all the funders, from VC to later round funders, are themselves 
managing other peoples’ money.81 The VC, for example, will have a set of 
limited partners—institutions like pension funds, university endowments, 
etc.—who contribute most of the capital to be invested it a range of start-ups, 
hoping for a few big scores.  The fund manager is compensated with sizable 
 
79 See Jesse Fried & Jeffrey Gordon, The Valuation and Governance Bubbles of Silicon Valley, 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/10/the-valuation-and-governance-
bubbles-of-silicon-valley/ 
80  See Pollman, supra note 4.  In the WeWork story, it was notable that SoftBank’s large 
later stage investment came with a rachet clause that promised to increase its equity in the 
event of an exit at a lower valuation than anticipated at the time of its investment, protecting 
it at the expense of other funders. See John C. Coffee, Jr.  Toxic Unicorns, 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/11/06/toxic-unicorns-what-has-been-
missed-about-weworks-fiasco/, Nov. 6, 2019.  Coffee observes that this dilution of others 
was not clearly disclosed even in the public offering documents filed with the SEC.   
81  On the conflicts and incentives associated with managed investment portfolios generally, 
see James Spindler, How Private is Private Equity and at What Cost?, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 311 
(2009); Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47  J. Acct’g Res. 391 (2009); John 
Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers, 123 Yale L.J. 1228 (2014); Anita Krug, 
Downstream Securities Regulation, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1589 (2014).   
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fees, often combining on-going management fees and high-powered incentive 
fees.  The asset base on which the periodic fees are calculated is based on current 
valuations—commonly, the price set at the latest round.  In this sense, the VC 
gets a tangible payoff from an inflated valuation even if, later on, the bubble 
deflates.  In a widely-noted article published recently, two financial economists 
criticized the industry for basing reported valuations on the most recent round’s 
price without adjustment for the special rights and privileges of pre-existing 
classes—a practice that they say inflates later-round private share values by 
nearly 50% compared to a more rigorous econometric method.82  In a recent 
SEC advisory, the staff observed that failures to value private funds’ holdings in 
accordance with the disclosed valuation process have led to overcharging 
management fees and carried interest based on inappropriately overvalued 
holdings.83 
Just as concerning are the effects of bubbles on the attraction of investors 
to new funds being sponsored by the VCs and later-round asset managers. 
These portfolio managers should be somewhat disciplined by the fact that they 
raise new rounds of capital as earlier portfolios age out—the failure to achieve 
real returns, not just inflated valuations, should be noticed by savvy investors 
looking for talented money managers. That discipline does exist for highly 
reputable funds that cater to savvy investors.84  But not all sources of private 
capital seem to figure that out, and so there are opportunities to new fund-
raising to high points in valuation, and of obscuring actual performance at the 
end of a fund’s run so that comparative success or failure is hard to parse out by 
any but the most astute.85  The emergence of mutual funds, with large numbers 
 
82  Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, 135 J. Fin. 
Econ. 120 (2020), discussed in Yves Smith, Fake Valuations are Running Roughshod Over the 
Venture Capital Industry, New York Magazine, Nov. 14, 2018, 
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/fake-unicorns-are-running-over-the-venture-
capital-industry.html. 
83  The SEC’s Office of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations recently issued a list of 
the kinds of conflicts of interest it has observed, including valuation biases.  Risk Alert: 
Observations from Examinations of Investment Advisers Managing Private Funds, June 23, 2020, at 
https://www.sec.gov/files/Private%20Fund%20Risk%20Alert_0.pdf.   
84  See Gregory Brown et al., Do Private Equity Funds Manipulate Reported Returns?, 132 J. Fin. 
Econ. 267 (2019) (demonstrating incentive of lower reputation funds to distort earnings, 
but suggesting that on average they do not success due to investor sophistication). 
85 On the incentives to obscure directed at those who invest in venture capital, see Indraneel 
Chakraborty & Michael Ewens, Managing Performance Signals through Delay: Evidence from 
Venture Capital, 64 Mgt. Sci. 2473 (2018); in private equity funds, see Brad Barber & Ayako 
Yasuda, Interim Fund Performance and Fundraising in Private Equity, 124 J. Fin. Econ. 172 
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of retail investors, as major funders has underscored this particular problem 
because they are constantly in search of new money.86  
We have only scratched the surface here, hopefully enough to add to the 
list of reasons why heavy monitoring might be in decline and the conventional 
monitoring model of venture finance under stress.  Presumably, sophisticated 
upstream suppliers of capital will understand the conflicts, seek out the 
intermediaries with good reputations, and insist on transparency and 
protection.  But less diligent investors will increasingly be subject to attraction 
to segments of the private markets via sales savvy as much or more than 
evidence of skill and loyalty,87 so that the conflicts of interest become all the 
more pernicious.88  How this works out in contemporary venture financing is 
still only dimly understood because of lack of transparency, but surely raises 
doubts about the assumption that upstream investor diligence offers a 
dependable check on founder overreaching as funders become more diverse in 
interests and incentives, and compete with each other for the allotments they 
lust over for more reasons than appear at first glance. 
 
III. WEWORK PART 2: CULTURE OF CONFLICTS 
 
 We now resume our case study of WeWork, where the 
hypermotivation and agency costs associated with corporate adolescence 
appeared to contribute to  the culture of conflicts and the lack of internal 
controls. From the self-interested transactions, to the taking of corporate 
 
(2017); Ludovic Phalippou, Beware of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. Econ. Perspectives 
147 (2009). 
86 See Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Start Ups?: A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan 
Fund’s Investments in Unicorns and Other Start-ups and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1341 (2017); Serge Chernenko et al., Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from 
Unicorns (NBER working paper, 2017).  The SEC recently proposed a good faith rule on the 
valuation of private investments by mutual funds.  Good Faith Determinations of Fair Value, IC-
33845 (April 21, 2020).   
87 On the wide variety of financial products that straddle the line between public and private, 
see Sun Eun (Summer) Kim, Typology of Public-Private Equity, 44 Fla. St. L. Rev. 1435 (2017).   
88 Of particular concern here are public pension funds, whose asset managers may be 
insulated from competitive pressures.  See William Clayton, Public Investment, Private Funds 
and State Law, Baylor L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2020).  Clayton points to SEC doubts about 
investor diligence in private equity, citing Speech by Andrew Borden, Spreading Sunshine in 
Private Equity, May 6, 2014, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014--
spch05062014ab.html; see also note – supra. 
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opportunities, to the personal loans and nepotism, the array of conflicts was 
considerable and implicated not just Neumann and his family but members of 
the board and the investment bankers.  
Neumann embodied all of the adolescent characteristics described in 
Part II.  He was bold, young, and male, and he had conflicts of every sort. He 
owned stakes in buildings leased to WeWork.89  He sold the trademark “We,” 
to the company for $6 million dollars.90  He had voting control over the 
company, and his wife had control over his replacement.91  He was allowed to 
“sell and borrow more than $1 billion dollars against his WeWork stake.”92   
The corporate adolescent culture also allowed for the masking of 
conflicts as creativity. Consider WeGrow, the school the Neumanns built, with 
WeWork money, to educate their own children. Whether through action or 
inaction, the board acquiesced in WeGrow, a school that had nothing to do with 
the business of the company – unless that nurturing the entrepreneurial spirit 
of elementary school children connects to the core of an office leasing company. 
Rebekah was the CEO and opened WeGrow at WeWork headquarters in the 
fall of 2018.  The for-profit school cost $42,000 per year and offered yoga, 
mindfulness, Spanish, Mandarin, and Hebrew.93  Like all WeWork projects, 
this one had its quirks, including that although parents were allowed into the 
family waiting room, nannies were required to wait outside.  Why?  Apparently 
because Rebekah Neumann did not want her nannies inside.94  In short, “‘The 
whole thing was about her and what was right for her children,’ a person close 
to the school said.”95  Indeed, when the Neumanns relocated to San Francisco 
 
89 We Co., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) 200 (Aug 
14, 2019) [hereinafter We Co. Registration Statement]. 
90 Eliot Brown, WeWork’s Long List of Potential Conflicts Adds to Questions Ahead of IPO, WALL 
ST. J.(Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weworks-long-list-of-potential-
conflicts-adds-to-questions-ahead-of-ipo-11567808023?mod=article_inline; We Co. 
Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 199.   
91 We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 197-98. 
92 Maureen Farrell and Eliot Brown, The Money Men Who Enabled Adam Neumann and the 
WeWork Debacle, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-money-
men-who-enabled-adam-neumann-and-the-wework-debacle-11576299616. 
93 Sarah Ashley O’Brien, WeWork's school, where kids farm, learn Hebrew and Mandarin, CNN 
Business (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/30/tech/wework-school-
wegrow/index.html.  
94 Sherman, supra note 22. 
95 Sherman, supra note 22. 
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in the winter of 2019, they took a teacher from WeGrow with them – a conflict 
within a conflict.96 
 Neumann also borrowed from the company – repeatedly.  At one point, 
the total seemed to be over $740 million tied to his shares in the company.97  
He also had a low-interest loan from the company for $380 million that allowed 
him to exercise stock options early.98  If the company had been public, this loan 
would have been illegal – as a result of the IPO issues and other excesses that 
led to the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002.99 
 In addition, the company employed lots of “Neumanns.”  Rebekah was   
CEO of WeGrow and the Chief Brand and Impact Officer at WeWork.100  Her 
brother-in-law was the Chief Product Officer.101  Adam’s brother-in-law ran 
the fitness part of the company.102 The company also regularly used contractors 
and vendors owned by executives.103 And, the parents of the Vice-Chair of the 
real estate division, were the real-estate brokers on a building lease in Miami.104 
Indeed, “[a]t an executive retreat in Montauk on Long Island, Mr. Neumann 
once raised a glass in a toast ‘to nepotism,’” further exhibiting the total lack of 
controls or even appreciation for them.105 No doubt, the nepotism contributed 
to the echo chamber of entitlement and confidence. 
 The board and investors also allowed Neumann to do something 
generally frowned upon in startups – when new money came in, Neumann sold 
his own stock and reaped profits.106 He also restructured the company’s voting 
stock in order to continue to maintain control.107 Bruce Dunlevie, from 
Benchmark, pushed back, arguing that “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”108 
 
96 Sherman, supra note 22. 
97 Brown, supra note 90.  
98We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 51, 199.  
99 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m (2002). 
100 We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 172, 197.  
101 Brown, supra note 90. 
102 Brown, supra note 90. 
103 Brown, supra note 90.We had a lease with a building in Miami owned by the brother of 
Arash Gohari, co-head of real estate.   
104 Brown, supra note 90. 
105 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92.  
106 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
107 When T Rowe price invested, Neumann restructured stock so his shares had 10 times the 
votes of normal shares.  See Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
108 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
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Despite those concerns, the board voted unanimously to allow both the voting 
stock change and the stock sales.   
 Neumann’s voting control, like that of Mark Zuckerberg, Travis 
Kalanick, and others, meant that he had the power to oust dissenting voices on 
the board. The early board had four people,109 but even as it grew with new 
investors, rising to nine by the time of the S-1, the culture of conflicts and 
Neumann’s voting power remained. The directors gave Neumann that power, 
but risked losing their seats and a view of the company in which they were 
invested – even though their legal role was as fiduciaries for the company and 
the other shareholders.    
 The conflicts were not limited to Neumann.  Indeed, the terms “related 
parties” or “related party” appeared more than 100 times in the prospectus the 
company filed.110 Consider the board member conflicts. WeWork employed 
the son of John Zhao, from the investor Hony Capital.111  Dunlevie’s daughter 
was also an employee.112  Lew Frankfort, the former CEO of Coach, Inc., 
“borrowed from WeWork to buy stock and exercise some stock options early 
-- a move typically made to save on taxes.”113  Steve Langman’s private equity 
group became a co-manager of the WeWork real-estate fund business and 
earned management fees and profits on any properties purchased.114  Then, 
when WeWork expanded its own involvement in the real-estate fund business, 
and Rhone’s stake decreased, WeWork gave him restricted shares to make up 
for the changed business model.115  In short, the culture bred conflicts at all 
 
109 The early board members were: Adam Neumann, Bruce Dunlevie (July 2012 – 
Benchmark), Steven Langman (May 2013 – Rhone), Lew Frankfort (July 2014). In 
September 2019: September 2019: Adam Neumann, Bruce Dunlevie, Steven Langman, 
Lewis Frankfort, John Zhao (added 2016 – Hony Capital), Mark Schwartz (March 2017 – 
former VC at Goldman), Ron Fisher (Nov 2017 - Softbank), Frances Frei (2019 – HBS 
Professor). 
110 We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89. 
111 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
112 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
113 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92; We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 207.  
114 Konrad Putzier, Investor’s Ties to WeWork Raise Conflict-of-Interest Concerns, WALL ST. J. 




115 We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 206.  
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levels, and because investors and board members alike were involved, no one 
had an incentive to say no. 
 The money continued to flow and so did the acquisitions and business 
decisions – arguably unrelated to the business of WeWork and certainly 
unchecked by the board.  The core business of WeWork was real estate, but it 
bought an event planning business, a search engine optimization company, and 
a coding school.116  Neumann made an offer for the salad company, Sweetgreen, 
Inc., and as noted before, opened WeGrow.117  The directors apparently raised 
concerns about the disparate choices, but the company kept spending on 
unrelated companies – with tacit, if not explicit, board approval. 
 Also, without board intervention, Neumann lavished money on an 
executive suite, building an exercise room and adding a sauna and ice bath to 
his offices in New York and San Francisco.  He used the company jet for 
personal trips,  when he decided to buy a top-of-the-line Gulfstream jet, the 
directors acquiesced – even though investors, like T. Rowe Price complained 
and told “management and the board that it had grown sour on the company.”118 
T. Rowe Price then sold off as much stock as it could in the SoftBank 
transactions.119 
 Throughout all of these transactions, the directors, who had a voice and 
could have, for example, made noisy exits, continued to enable the scheme and 
hope for an IPO.  Why?  Because they had money in the company, and they 
believed the public markets would provide both an exit and a necessary check 
on Neumann.  As a result, Schwartz, Dunlevie, and Langman urged Neumann 
to commit to an IPO, but Softbank and Neumann resisted – at least until 
Softbank’s own investment value plunged.120 
 The banks also played a role.  Just like at Enron, the bankers had been 
developing relationships with Neumann, hoping for the IPO.  They had earned 
fees on the private offerings and were invested in the company, but now, 
millions of dollars in IPO fees were around the corner, and Neumann’s self-
prescribed “personal banker,”121 Jamie Dimon and Goldman Sachs were 
 
116 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92; We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 35.  
117 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
118 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
119 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
120 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
121 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. JPMorgan led a $500 million credit line to Mr. 
Neumann and lent another $97 million in other forms of debt, largely mortgages with low 
rates on his many homes. We Co. Registration Statement, supra note 89, at 216.  
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onboard.  They provided no check or balance, drafting a prospectus that was 
subject to derision for its wacky language and valuations that the market 
immediately rejected as unsupported by a company that had turned a profit only 
once – many years prior.  Investors also revolted against the “string of 
conflicts.”122 
Indeed, according to the Financial Times, the investment banks vying for 
the IPO pitched Neumann with valuation numbers based on nothing more than 
“teenage exuberance.”  Proposals ranged from $46 to $63 billion (JP Morgan), 
$61 to $96 billion (Goldman Sachs), and $43 to $104 billion (Morgan 
Stanley).123  Yet, when the public spoke, WeWork had to ratchet down its 
expectations, pulling the offering when the valuation was trending toward $15 
billion, or more than $30 billion below the valuation at the time of the last 
Softbank infusion.   
The underwriting arm of the banks, of course, had already earned 
millions in fees and stood to gain much more on the public offering as well as 
loans they planned to structure. JP Morgan had loaned Neumann, in his 
personal capacity, hundreds of millions of dollars, including for the buildings 
that he bought and then leased back to WeWork.  Indeed, the role of the banks 
in WeWork, its “growth”, and its IPO has been described as “enabling,” to be 
distinguished from evaluating, checking, balancing, or even providing healthy 
skepticism.124 
 As IPO hopes deflated, and in an attempt to stem controversy and 
complaints, Neumann searched for more money and added a woman to the 
board – without consulting the other directors.  When they found out, they 
“vented” about it at a board meeting, where typically, Neumann was not 
present.  Later, Neumann apologized and said he would  change his ways.125  
Nevertheless, he pushed back on the governance changes his bankers said were 
necessary for the IPO – acceding when desperation prevailed. Neumann then 
agreed to: the appointment of a lead independent director by the end of the 
year, a 50 percent decrease in his voting rights, and the elimination of the 
 
122 Banks had warned Neumann the conflicts would be a problem.  Farrell and Brown, supra 
note 92. 
123 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Eric Platt, James Fontanella-Khan, and Laura Noonan, 
WeWork turmoil puts spotlight on JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs, Financial Times (Sep. 24, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/272d408e-de40-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59. 
124 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
125 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
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provision allowing his wife to select his successor.126 It was, however, too little, 
too late.   
The interest in the offering was insufficient, and calls for Neumann to 
step down grew. Even Mr. Son’s representative board members  understood 
that Neumann had to go. Indeed, investors and executives at companies backed 
by Softbank urged Son to move against Neumann.127 Finally, Dimon told 
Neumann he had to choose – IPO or CEO.128   
For Neumann, the choice was clear.  If he didn’t step down, the IPO 
would not happen.  There would be no cash, and his stake would be worthless.  
At first, he agreed to relinquish his CEO title but not voting control, but to do 
so, he demanded payment, and Softbank bought him out with a consulting fee 
and stock purchases. Then, the board forgave $1.75 million in funds he owed 
to WeWork for personal travel and other expenses.129  When the offering failed 
outright, the board switched its focus to saving the company. 
Ironically, reflecting on the process many months later, Goldman’s 
CEO, David Solomon, indicated that the public process was key to the demise 
of WeWork and that the private process was to blame.  Speaking on a Unicorn 
panel at Davos in January of 2020, Solomon stated, “One of the things that I’ve 
said publicly... is the process actually worked around WeWork.”130 In an IPO, 
the banks are faced with a private company with numbers that are not public 
and must work with the company to see whether the model works – before 
setting an actual public market value.  According to Solomon, the vetting 
occurs when, ultimately there’s a diligence process, there’s a proving out 
process, there, at times, are meetings with investors beforehand, and that 
process grounds to reality.”131  The WeWork process, he said, worked, even if 
it “might not have been as pretty as everybody would like it to be.”132  As he 
noted, part of the issue is that private companies are also “not held to the same 
 
126 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
127 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
128 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
129 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
130 Oscar Williams-Grut, Goldman Sachs CEO defends work on failed WeWork IPO, Yahoo! Finance 
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/davos-2020-unicorns-wework-ipo-
david-solomon-stacey-cunningham-goldman-145306829.html. 
131 Williams-Grut, supra note 130.  
132 Williams-Grut, supra note 130.  
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standard around producing information” as their public counterparts,133 
arguably causing distortions like those in Uber, Theranos and WeWork.   
Importantly, missing from these statements is a recognition, let alone 
ownership, of Goldman’s contribution to this “private” adolescence.  Goldman 
and the other banks provided funding to WeWork, series after series, along the 
way, enabling every choice of Neumann.  At each series, the banks had the 
power to set the valuation and the opportunity to demand better information 
from the company.  Yet, only when faced with the public regime, their own 
potential for strict liability, and the market rejection of an arguably ridiculous, 
if not false, prospectus, that they were forced to recalibrate and withdraw the 
offering.   
IV. PRIVATE PRIVILEGES, ENABLING BOARDS, AND FIDUCIARY DEFICITS 
 
Start-up financing occurs under a set of exemptions, some long-
standing, others more recent—that remove the disclosure obligations required 
in public markets on the assumption that private ordering suffices.134  This 
exemptive privilege, in turn, assumes that the parties to the sequential rounds 
of financing will be faithful agents, i.e., fiduciaries, to their own sources of 
capital.  Where there are conflicts of interest, fiduciary deficits will arise unless 
either the threat of litigation for breaches of duty sufficiently deters the 
resulting opportunism or the sources of capital are themselves sufficiently 
watchful and savvy to combat the opportunism.  As sources of private capital 
become more numerous and diverse, as suggested in Part II, the latter may not 
happen so reliably.   
By all accounts, WeWork’s extraordinary growth over eight rounds of 
financing strengthened Neumann’s hand and concealed ample danger signs.  In 
the absence of required disclosure, fiduciary duties take on extra significance.  
We understand that the board was limited in its power once Neumann took his 
super-voting rights, and lost more maneuvering room when Softbank opened 
its checkbook with what seemed to be blind faith in Neumann leadership.  
There is still a cautionary story about governance failure.  This Part thus turns 
to the role of the WeWork board of directors in this story. 
 
 
133 Williams-Grut, supra note 130. 
134 See, e.g., Virginia E. Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure & The Costs of Private Ordering, 
55 AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 407. 
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A. The Culture of Conflicts and an Enabling Board 
 
 Consider the simple controls built into the fiduciary duties of directors 
and officers and how they were designed to address these issues. Duties of 
candor, obligations surrounding conflicts of interest and corporate 
opportunities, and requirements for conscious choices (whether “good” or 
“bad”) should mediate agency costs. Those duties are about loyalty, good faith, 
and oversight, and all were at issue in the WeWork story, where the board 
enabled conflicts, was controlled by Neumann, and neglected the investors and 
stakeholder employees who funded it.  
The boards are missing in the WeWork saga and those of its “peers.” 
With each additional funding round, while WeWork’s paper valuation grew, 
the mechanisms for control did not. When Masayoshi Son told Adam Neumann 
to spend faster, Neumann did so, and the directors failed to ask questions and 
question answers.135 The company grew, the nature of the investors changed, 
but the leaders did not grow up. Instead, they went to summer camp  and drank 
tequila shots, seemingly stuck in adolescence, while the board watched but did 
not engage.136 In doing so, the board abdicated its most important 
responsibility: to make, not avoid, decisions, thus violating duties of care and 
loyalty, including good faith. There are many complicated reasons for these 
failures, which Elizabeth Pollman has detailed – contracts around or embedding 
conflicts, investor outs, and ratchets to name a few.137  Her premise, with which 
we do not quibble, is that startup governance problematizes corporate 
governance norms.138 It does not, however, eliminate the duties – just the 
internal controls those duties impose and create. 
 In short, good faith and the disclosure discourse inherent in it is designed 
to play a role in establishing internal controls – even in startups and 
problematically, with longer term corporate adolescents. Recall Mark 
Schwartz’s statements at WeWork’s board meeting on October 3, 2019, 
 
135 Brooker, supra note 35.  
136 Eliot Brown, How Adam Neumann’s Over-the-Top Style Built WeWork. ‘This Is Not the Way 
Everybody Behaves.’, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-is-
not-the-way-everybody-behaves-how-adam-neumanns-over-the-top-style-built-wework-
11568823827. 
137 Pollman, supra note 4. See Coffee, supra note 80.  Coffee describes how WeWork’s ratchet 
clause was primarily held by principal backer, Masyoshi Son, whose investment was 
protected in the form of millions of dollars if the WeWork IPO failed to reach its lofty goals 
– creating a conflict between him and other shareholders. 
138 Pollman, supra note 4. 
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noting  that he had “stayed silent too long.” And that he would tolerate “[n]o 
more fantasies.”139 According to the Wall Street Journal, Schwartz and his fellow 
directors had “stayed silent so long that the story was almost over.”140 In doing 
so, the directors enjoyed the privilege of private status, doomed the company’s 
IPO, and failed to adhere to their fiduciary duties. 
Neumann, who was no longer CEO, was present at that board meeting; 
yet, when CEO, he rarely attended board meetings -- presumably, because he 
controlled the decisions anyway. Yet, allowing him to skip meetings was a 
failure on the board’s part. So, why was he there this time?  Because WeWork 
was “perilously low on cash after years of freewheeling spending” and was the 
“butt of jokes on Wall Street.”141  Despite receiving almost $40 billion in cash 
over the years, arguably a powerful misallocation of capital, at the date of the 
board meeting, the hoped for IPO had crashed and burned, and the company 
had only a few weeks of funds left.  
 To be sure, the directors repeated silence was a governance failure. 
Indeed, the failure of the people and entities on which the privilege of private 
ordering was bestowed and the resulting failure of culture was enabled by board 
members and investment bankers, all of whom failed to engage.142 This board, 
like those of other corporate adolescents, was comprised of investor 
representatives with negotiated roles. From Softbank, which, through 
Masayoshi Son, urged Neumann to spend with abandon, to the venture 
capitalists who did not raise or push issues, the board members failed to fulfill 
their fiduciary duties.  The gatekeeper bankers, of course, were not on the 
board, and they funded the choices, supporting Neumann, championing the 
company, and hoping for the chance to do the IPO – at least until publicness 
intervened.143 And, everyone joined in the adolescent culture, enabling the 
culture of conflicts to grow unchecked.144 
Consider the conflicts and related party transactions listed in the 
prospectus and detailed in Part III. The WeWork offering documents stated 
 
139 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
140 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
141 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
142 The funding and growth processes were fraught with conflicts of interest on all sides, and 
as the investors “ceded control,” the company spun out of control missing projections – year 
after year.Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
143 Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
144 Consider, John Zhao, from Hony Capital, who invested after doing tequila shots with and 
being sprayed with a fire extinguisher by Neumann. Farrell and Brown, supra note 92. 
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that all were approved by the board, but after reading about how the board 
operated and its culture of silence, one wonders what really happened with each 
conflict. Indeed, the fact that many of the directors had conflicts of their own 
presumably embedded a you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours culture that 
lowered the threshold for discourse and candor and enabled Neumann’s 
ongoing conflicts. Who wants to engage in deep scrutiny of another’s conflict 
when it might result in greater scrutiny of your own? Moreover, as Part II 
revealed, the motivations of the board members are at best mixed even before 
the culture of conflicts becomes embedded. Here, the result was the failure to 
examine and recognize privilege, the failure to understand the choices, and the 
failure of the IPO.145 
 Notably, without affirmative approval by disinterested directors or 
shareholders, corporate law once would have declared many of the WeWork 
conflicts void and now views them as voidable. Yet, there are no “disinterested” 
or independent directors in today’s startups.146 Even if they are not implicated 
in the Neumann-specific transactions and thus conflicted in the traditional 
sense, the behavior of the WeWork directors reveals that they viewed their role 
as enablers of the choices and were unwilling or incapable of playing the role 
corporate law prescribes. Indeed, conflicted themselves, they did not question 
the choices or give voice to concerns; instead, enjoying the privileges of the 
private offering regime and engaging in the very fiduciary deficits corporate law 
is designed to prevent. 
B. The Nature of Candor, Discourse, and Good Faith 
Traditionally, the role of venture capitalists on startup boards was 
perceived as providing a strong guiding hand to get the company to maturity.147 
 
145 See also Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures, 107 Geo. L. Rev 967 
(2018)(analyzing how transparency and disclosure decrease in the face of when companies 
experience downturns). 
146 See Michael Ewens & Nadya Malenko, Board Dynamics Over the Startup Life Cycle, NBER 
Working Paper No. w.277769 (Sept. 2020) (providing evidence of timing and role of 
independent directors in start-ups and opining on their potential as mediators and advisors).  
147 The conventional view of venture capitalists on start-up boards, with which we do not 
take issue, received considerable scholarly attention – but mostly before the more recent 
growth in private funding rounds. For articles exploring that view, see, e.g., Jesse M. Fried 
& Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967, 
990 (2006) (lauding VCs on the board as able to control entrepreneur opportunism, monitor 
operations, and if necessary, implement new management); see also Brian Broughman & 
Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 
Cornell L. Rev. 1319, 1329 n.39 (2013). 
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Yet, the dialogue and engagement necessary to effect that was missing at 
WeWork. Also seemingly missing were conversations about conflicts and 
whether they should be avoided, or the question-asking, dialogue-building role 
that would allow the directors to vet risks and challenge management’s 
understanding of its own role, choices, and privileged status.  
Indeed, the power of good faith discourse is that it has the power to alter 
choices – and that is its purpose.148 It can reaffirm initial choices, and that is also 
its purpose. Both outcomes are examples of the power of the information-
forcing-substance theory in action. Both are also examples of active and engaged 
decision making149 – the opposite of staying silent and feeding fantasies. And, 
they are examples of good faith in application and the creative friction that 
boards are supposed to provide and is their value. The goal is the conversation, 
the dialogue, the discourse, and the substance it produces.  
Corporate directors, even those adhering to the proverbial nose-in-
fingers-out line, are required to engage in monitoring and oversight.150 This 
fiduciary duty is at the core of the good-faith obligation rooted in the duty of 
loyalty. Staying silent was not Mark Schwartz’s role – nor was it the role of any 
of the other directors. In doing so, they presumably failed to make conscious 
choices – a precondition for the application of the business judgment rule.151 
They also presumably violated their duty of care and arguably failed to act in 
the face of problematic information, a hallmark of bad faith, which when 
sustained violates good faith.152 
 
148 See Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 Geo. L.J. 1045 (2019); see also Robert B. 
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon 
Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859 (2019). 
149 See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure 
and Corporate Governance, 66 Duke L.J. 763, 788 (2016) (discussing the information-forcing-
substance theory and how dialogue can result in either a different outcome or the same 
outcome and both reflect active decision-making). 
150 Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark's Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 729 (2007). 
151 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863 (Del. 1985). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that the business judgment rule presumes that directors “acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company”). 
152 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“Where directors fail to act in the face of 
a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, 




Of course, corporate law has the ability to sanction bad faith via 
derivative litigation, and deception via the duty of candor.  But these are 
notoriously difficult to prove.  Delaware courts have carved out room for a 
disloyalty claim for exit transactions that favor preferred stockholders (i.e., 
funders) over founders and employees who hold options, signaling that 
directors cannot simply claim loyalty to those shareholders responsible for their 
appointment to the board.  But this “Trados” line of cases has been heavily 
criticized by academics as inefficient and unrealistic,153 and in any event has not 
been extended to oversight or monitoring.  The natural human inclination to 
represent one’s principal is hard to overcome. Independent directors have 
persuasively been characterized as there mainly to play a mediator role, limiting 
their involvement unless needed to referee a dispute between founders and 
funders.  This enables avoidance when the primary constituents are at peace, 
which is likely when the start-up has momentum.  
There are also practical reasons to doubt that litigation will produce an 
optimal level of attentiveness, whether state or (as to fraud) federal.154 There 
are many reasons for this result, including, for example, the ratchet provision 
protecting Mayoshi, and as Elizabeth Pollman points out, the contracts and 
other provisions investors build in to protect themselves. Further, in the case 
of WeWork, we know that T. Rowe Price, a key institutional investor, 
recouped its earlier stage investment in a later round while making clear that it 
was disgusted by the company’s antics. That ability to recoup, however, also 
decreases the likelihood of litigation. Conflicts of interest may arise as well – 
portfolio managers may hesitate to sue well-established VC’s and other early 
investors because the result might be exclusion from future opportunities. 
 
153  See Pollman, supra note 4; Sarath Sanga & Eric Talley, Don’t Go Chasing Waterfalls: Fiduciary 
Duties in Venture Capital-backed Startups, Oct. 31, 2020, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3721814.   
154 For doubts about litigation, see Verity Winship, Private Company Fraud, U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
(forthcoming, 2020); Pollman, supra note 2.  To their concerns, we would add some 
additional points. If it is indeed true that VCs and other early funders want to avoid too much 
potentially troubling information even when represented on the board, this might result 
from—or be motivated by—a desire to avoid the scienter required under Rule 10b-5 in suits 
brought by later arrivals to the funding party.  In many jurisdictions, sophisticated purchasers 
of securities can lose their fraud remedy—even when lied to about material facts—if they 
failed to do due diligence, a considerable (and perhaps reputation-tainting) possibility when 
financing rounds are done quickly and many investors want in on the action.  Conflicts of 
interest may arise as well—portfolio managers may hesitate to sue well-established VCs and 
other early investors if it might result in being excluded from future opportunities.  See also 
supra note 4. 
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The challenge in WeWork and other unicorn adolescents is that the 
privilege of private status was not designed for companies that stay “private” for 
as long as or of the size of WeWork. It was designed with the idea that 
sophisticated investors, including venture capitalists and banks, would invest in 
the companies, perform gatekeeping functions, nurture the companies, and 
allow the public regime, including its powerful litigation remedies, to take 
over.155  
This, then, is where the system failed. The private offering regime has 
layered on privileges for adolescents incapable of managing the business, 
particularly long term, let alone navigating lines related to legality. The 
mythology has fueled spectacular growth and equally spectacular failures, 
making money for venture capitalists, banks, and money managers, but without 
asking the corporate adolescents or their funders to adult up. The result is the 
misallocation of capital, risky choices, and spillovers to downstream investors 
and stakeholders.156  
In the end, WeWork failed to sustain it massive valuation in ways that 
seem to have confounded regulators, policy makers and the academics.  The 
companies evolved, but private governance aspirations failed to do so. The 
system simply is not designed for long-term “startup” governance, and 
WeWork reveals the systemic slack and flaws. The “fix” requires some of the 
myth busting we have attempted in this article and understanding that the 
system is not nearly perfect. The reliance on  reputational capital, if appropriate 
a decade ago, is no longer so.157 Indeed, assuming that conflicts and fiduciary 
deficits are unsolvable or always beneficial produces WeWorks. When the 
adults in the room are not accountable for the adolescents, candor, discourse, 
and good faith don’t stand a chance: there is no internal control system to 
 
155 Compare Fried & Ganor, supra note 147 (stating “[s]tartup boards – unlike public company 
boards – are also frequently and intimately involved in strategic decision making and 
personnel issues.”) with Lerner & Nanda, supra note 3, at 252 (emphasizing the rise of 
founder friendly behavior and the pressure for VCs not to be overbearing). See also Ewens 
& Malenko, supra note 146 (discussing the fall of VC majority board control from 60% in 
2002 to 25% for startups originated in 2013). 
156 Yusuf Khan, WeWork is reportedly cutting 2,000 jobs as soon as this week, with the staff turning 
against Adam Neumann, MARKETS INSIDER (Oct. 15, 2019) 
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/wework-reportedly-cutting-2000-
jobs-staff-turning-on-ceo-adam-neumann-2019-10-1028598379#. 
157 See Fried & Gordon, supra note 79 (discussing VC’s fascination with brand name, late-




prevent fiduciary deficits. When fiduciary obligations fail to grow with the 
funding rounds, the need for an increased focus on risk and its consequences is 
ignored.158 Yet, as a company’s reach grows, the range of harm also expands, 
allowing failures that impact many more people and stakeholders than simply 
the venture capitalists and investment banks.159 
V. CONCLUSION 
Drawing from the WeWork saga and academic research about changing 
motivations, incentives and opportunities in start-up financing, we see an 
accumulating set of deficits that makes the current state of affairs more 
problematic than the conventional account would suggest: 
(1) Founder control is more likely, enabling more sustained self-
centered and biased behaviors that, even if adaptive to an extent, 
produce risky behaviors among those not able to handle the 
glorification or freedom. 
(2) The market for funding is more crowded, with private equity and 
venture finance being offered by a wider range of funders who 
have diverse incentives driven by the opportunities for fees and 
new funding opportunities before earlier investments pan out or 
not.  As such, agency cost issues are present not simply at the 
level of the start-up, but upstream to the relationship between 
funders and their own (increasingly diverse and not always 
sophisticated) sources of capital. 
(3) Start-up valuations are set in a market lacking many of the 
mechanisms of efficiency and subject to a winner’s curse, which 
plays into these upstream and downstream incentives and biases. 
As a result of all the foregoing, fiduciary and information-forcing 
norms weaken. 
(4) Directors focus on constituent protection or conflict mediation 
in exercising whatever power they possess, rather than attending 
in good faith to their duties of candor, care and loyalty. 
 
158 Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness” supra note 4 (describing the need for two distinct 
tiers of companies within securities regulation: first, those with a large societal footprint for 
which “full publicness treatment should be reserved” and second, smaller companies needing 
only core disclosure obligations and governance requirements.) 
159 Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness” supra note 4 (highlighting how the fall of companies 
such as Enron and WorldCom damages shareholders and debt holders, and employees, 
retirees, and competitors, and cause distortions in the market in which they operate). 
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(5) These deficits combine with the fast-growing flow of money into 
start-up financing to enable a longer period of undisciplined 
corporate adolescence during which the misbehavior risk rises, 
threatening investors and others  
 
 That is as far as we will go here.  What to do about all of this is a hard 
question; we recognize, for example, that expansive disclosure requirements 
are not necessarily well suited for start-ups pursuing innovative strategies. 
However, we are convinced that the more dark space we afford start-ups and 
funders in the name of innovation, the more important it is for there to be good 
governance to oversee how that freedom is being used and to lessen the 
fiduciary deficits exhibited in the WeWork story and elsewhere. Maybe the 
better policy is to nudge start-ups toward a quicker IPO, with at least some of 
the rites of passage.160 At least then disclosure and publicness have the potential 
to shed light on the private choices of funders and founders.161   
We are more confident as to what not to do, but is happening rapidly.  
For much of its history, as noted earlier, securities regulation sought to limit 
access to the private markets to qualified investors presumed able to fend for 
 
160  Other regulatory reforms associated with the JOBS Act simplified the IPO process for 
emerging growth companies, which produced a step-up in biotech capital formation and 
accompanying innovation.  See Craig Lewis & Joshua White, Deregulating Innovation Capital: 
The Effect of the JOBS Act on Biotech Start-ups, Aug. 2020, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3640852.  But see Coffee, supra 
note 80.  
161  From a policy perspective, there is good reason to consider tweaking the law if only to 
lessen the negative externalities of start-up misbehavior on others.  Private issuers attract 
capital from investors in a competitive market including a wide range of opportunities; 
misinformation or other deficits result in a misallocation of capital, distorting investment 
choices and harming non-cheating firms competing for capital based on the bona fide qualities 
of their ideas.  See, e.g., Elizabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the 
Decline of the Public Company, 68 Hastings L.J. 445 (2017); Langevoort & Thompson, 
“Publicness” supra note 4. The misallocation in turn adversely affects labor markets (especially 
when, as in the tech field, equity-based compensation is so common), among others. See 
Yifat Aran, Making Disclosures Work for Start-up Employees, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 867; 
Jennifer Fan, Employees as Regulators: The New Private Ordering in High Tech Companies, 2019 
Utah L. Rev. 973.  This is the main reason we, like others, would favor moving public 
company status and the attendant governance obligations to a somewhat earlier phase in the 
successful start-up’s adolescence, once the basic science or technology is in place and  before 
its footprint on society grows deeper and deeper.   
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themselves, a category that has expanded slowly but surely in recent decades.162  
In the JOBS Act of 2012, Congress gave a boost to the effort by making it easier 
to prospect for such accredited investors.  While this was often portrayed in 
terms of allowing start-ups to find a greater number of investors, the main 
effect was to give investment intermediaries (e.g., hedge funds) greater ability 
to attract capital to invest under its portfolio management, exacerbating the 
upstream agency cost problem and diminishing the ability of conventional VCs 
to dampen adolescent impulses. 
This effort accelerated considerably in 2019, when the SEC announced 
its intention to enlarge the size of the retail investor population entitled to cross 
the wall and participate in private investment.163  The category of accredited 
investors was soon enlarged, and more reforms adopted in late fall 2020.  The 
Commission doubled down on the strategy by proposing exemptive212 relief 
from broker-dealer status to those who hustle to find accredited investors for 
private offerings.164  The Department of Labor joined the deregulation party 
with its own ERISA-based directive to allow retirement savings of accredited 
investors to move more heavily in alternative private investments.  The “equity” 
claim that they deserve comparable investment opportunities to those now 
limited to the relatively privileged few comes through loud and clear.  There is 
no reason, however, to believe that retail investors newly introduced into this 
space will find comparable opportunities to those afforded truly sophisticated, 
experienced players who can lean in against agency costs in how their money is 
invested.  Rather, these new investors will find their way to market segments 
where salesmanship and marketing savvy abound and then overpay in search of 
already picked-over chances. How well upstream investors fend for themselves 
remains to be seen: we know much too little. Yet the regulatory movement is 
 
162 See Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness” supra note 4. Once based on subjective factors 
like genuine sophistication and ready access to information, the scope of the exemptive 
philosophy has become more objective over time: today, financial status (more than $1 
million in assets, or more than $200,000 in annual income, with a variety of adjustments) 
sets the basic threshold, with a higher level of wealth ($5 million in investible assets) needed 
to invest in high performance fee-paying entities in the private capital markets, like hedge 
funds.  Less well-off investors, as we have seen, can enter the private investment realm, but 
for the most part, only through a willingness to invest through more heavily regulated mutual 
funds and similar vehicles.) 
163 Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, Rel. 33-10649, Sept. 24, 
2019.  Some rules have already been amended.  See Amending the Accredited Investor Definition, 
Rel. 33-10824, Aug. 26, 2020); Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Opportunity by 
Improving Access to Capital in Private Markets, Rel. 33-10844, Nov. 2, 2020). 
164  Exemptive Relief Under Section 15(a), Rel. 34-90112, Oct. 7, 2020. 
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to open the private markets to more retail investors, ignoring the costs of the 
fiduciary deficits and, instead, relying on the myth of corporate adolescence, 
the infatuation with innovation, and the winning lottery tickets for those who 
get in the game early enough. 
Why the politics of entrepreneurial capital-raising are tilting this way is 
a complicated question.  No doubt much of what is pushing this is pure special 
interest muscle, which is a good reason by itself for legal academics to take 
more of an interest in the subject.  The inspiring narratives about start-ups as 
drivers of innovation and job creation, geniuses who promise to invent us a 
better future, and the potential “equal playing field” created by allowing more 
retail investors into a space heretofore reserved for the already over-privileged 
all enable corporate adolescence. 
Our cautionary note here, then, is not that innovation is an unworthy 
goal compared to investor protection, but simply that the assessment should be 
a sober one. High-tech innovation, after all, has decidedly mixed effects on 
employment, destroying jobs at incumbent firms without necessarily creating a 
comparable number of new ones.  Some researchers believe that we are facing 
a time of harder-to-find good technological ideas,165 meaning that the money 
chasing the best ideas will face greater risk of disappointment on average and a 
winner’s curse as to financing the occasional breakthroughs.  Meanwhile, the 
fees keep coming to the money managers. There is reason to question the 
assumption that the system of entrepreneurial finance we’ve chosen is 
necessarily the best—or fairest—at allocating capital to the most socially 
productive ideas.166  Thus, the payoff from telling stories like WeWork, and of 
coming to better understand ever-changing incentives for rent-seeking inside 
that system, is that we expose the adolescent culture of conflicts and fiduciary 





165 See Nicholas Bloom et al., Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?, 110 Am. Econ. Rev. 1104 
(2020).  Even a decade ago, there was some recognition that venture capital is less “scalable” 
than private equity generally.  See Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private 
Equity Funds, 23 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2303 (2010). 
166  Lerner & Nanda, supra note 3.  See also Nathan Heller, Is Venture Capital Worth the Risk?, 
The New Yorker, Jan. 27, 2020. 
